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We document the rise in unemployment in South Africa since the transition in
1994. We describe how changes in labour supply interacted with stagnant labour
demand to produce unemployment rates that peaked between 2001 and 2003.
Meanwhile, compositional changes in employment at the sectoral level widened
the gap between the skill-level of the employed and the unemployed. Using
nationally representative panel data, we show that stable unemployment rates
mask high individual-level transition rates in labour market status. Our analysis
highlights several key constraints to addressing unemployment in South Africa.
We conclude that unemployment is near equilibrium levels and is unlikely to self-
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1. Introduction
 
Regardless of the measure used, too many South Africans are unemployed. Even
by a narrow definition, about 26 percent of the labour force is currently un-
employed. It has not always been this way. Unemployment appeared to be
fairly low through the 1970s and 1980s, although data limitations preclude
certainty. At the time of democratic transition in 1994, unemployment was sub-
stantially lower than it is today. A nationally representative survey conducted just
before the transition indicated that unemployment was 13 percent, but by the end
of the decade, unemployment had jumped to almost 30 percent. This article focuses
on the causes of this increase and the reasons why unemployment has remained
high.
We rely on a decade of detailed nationally representative household surveys
to inform our inquiry, and we place a greater emphasis on the more recent data.
We begin our analysis in Section 2 by documenting unemployment and the char-
acteristics of the labour force in South Africa. This section puts forth the set of
facts that lay the groundwork for our explanation of the current high unemploy-
ment rate. We find that the supply of labour increased after the fall of apartheid.
In particular, there was an unprecedented influx of African women into the
labour market. On the whole, these new entrants into the labour market tended to
be relatively unskilled. At about the same time, the overall demand for labour
levelled-off and, in the mining and agricultural sectors, the demand for labour,
especially less-skilled labour, fell. Skill-biased technical change further contri-
buted to the decline in the demand for unskilled labour. While unskilled labour
demand was shrinking, there was a huge influx of relatively unskilled labour,
and unemployment among the less-skilled and/or less-experienced workers
ballooned.
Section 3 investigates the compositional changes in employment at the
sectoral level and the accompanying trends in wages. The employment share and
real wages of high-skilled workers have increased as industries shifted towards
more skilled workers. The unemployed are becoming, on average, less-skilled as
unemployment rates for those with a matric or less increase (see footnote 6). As the
gap widens between the skill level of the employed and that of the unemployed,
policies to transition the unemployed into the labour market face even greater
hurdles.
Section 4 moves beyond the sectoral viewpoint of Section 3 and examines
unemployment at the level of the individual. Having documented the rather
bleak picture of the labour market in Sections 2 and 3, we next investigate why
unemployment has persisted. In the simplest economic models, when supply
increases while demand is falling, we expect prices (wages) to fall to clear the
market. While there is some evidence that real wages fell in South Africa during
the worst years of unemployment, the nominal decline that would have been
necessary to clear the labour market was simply too large to be politically or
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socially acceptable. Furthermore, there were institutional constraints that kept
wages from declining as much as they otherwise might have. We find, for
example, a persistent union wage differential suggesting that unions are
propping up wages for union members. While this is good news for employed
union members, it poses additional challenges to addressing the unemployment
problem.
One way in which unemployment might have been reduced would have been
for South Africa to ‘inflate’ its way out of the morass. With inflation and fairly
constant nominal wages, the real declines could, in principle, clear the market.
However, inflation and the resulting decline in real wages were not politically
acceptable either since South Africa was under intense scrutiny by the international
community in the years after transition.
There are at least three reasons why unemployment has remained at such
high levels. First, job search appears to be less effective for African job seekers
compared to whites, which is likely due to the spatial separation between the
business centres and the outlying areas where Africans reside. The lack of
affordable public transportation undoubtedly contributes to this problem. After
decades of institutionalized racial discrimination, remnants surely persist, and,
when combined with high search costs, even a small degree of discrimination
could cause the high unemployment rates we observe. Second, while we might
expect the informal sector to provide employment, especially in these outlying
areas, and absorb many who would otherwise be unemployed, it has not.
Unlike other African countries, the informal sector has grown very little as
participation and unemployment rates have risen. Crime rates and high start-
up costs for small businesses probably impede its growth. As for the role of
reservation wages in the unemployment story, it remains fairly opaque. Our
results suggest that the generous Old Age Pension scheme contributes to the
unemployment problem as pension income is often used to support other
members of the household, especially younger workers. We also consider
whether recent changes in the returns to education may be propping up the
reservation wage.
We conclude that while there may be some elements of the recent increase in
unemployment that result from temporary ‘shocks’ away from the equilibrium
rate, most of the evidence points to structural changes in the labour market that
resulted from the dismantling of apartheid. The evidence suggests that the
equilibrium rate of unemployment has in fact increased. Active policy is necessary
because the problem is not likely to be self-correcting.
 
2. The structure of unemployment and labour input
 
In this section we describe some of the key patterns in the data that motivate
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 Several interesting facts emerge.
First of all, unemployment, irrespective of the measure adopted, is extremely high,
and has increased substantially since the African National Congress came to power
after South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994. Using the ILO definition,
unemployment doubled between 1995 and 2001, going from an already high
unemployment rate of 15.6 percent to 30.3 percent. Since then, it has declined but




 We use the ILO
definition for international comparability, however, this definition almost certainly
understates the magnitude since discouraged workers are part of the unemploy-
ment problem. Second, labour force participation also substantially increased since
the end of apartheid. Using the ILO definition, it increased by 6 percentage points,









The International Labour Organization (ILO) definition of unemployment classifies working age individuals
as being in the labour force if during a week of reference they were employed or wanted to work and were
available to start working within a week but also had actively looked for work during the past four weeks.
This is also referred to as the narrow definition. We also present statistics that use an extended or broader
definition of labour force participation and unemployment by eliminating the requirement of having




Our statistics are not exactly the same as those officially published by STATS-SA since we restrict our




A concern with the 1995 October Household Survey is that several districts in KwaZulu/Natal were not
surveyed because they were considered too dangerous for the survey teams. The population in these areas
was about 3 million, so the omission may be important. Survey weights were calculated to compensate for
this problem (see Butcher and Rouse, 2001). However, the fact that these workers are not represented must
be kept in mind when comparing later periods to 1995.
Table 1. Participation, employment and unemployment rates (%)
Year ILO classification Broad classification
Participation Employment Unemployment Participation Unemployment
1995 51.4 43.3 15.6 60.3 28.2
1997 48.2 37.5 22.1 60.6 38.0
1999 55.4 41.7 24.8 69.0 39.9
2001 59.4 41.4 30.3 72.1 42.5
2003 56.8 40.6 28.6 70.6 42.5
2005 57.2 41.9 26.7 71.2 41.1
Notes: All statistics are for population 16–64 years old.
Source: Authors’ calculations using the October Household Survey and the September wave of the Labor
Force Survey.
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tend to have lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates than OECD




Table 2 presents the recent trends in participation, employment and unemploy-
ment by gender. As is often the case, males are more likely to participate in the
labour market and less likely to be unemployed. Indeed, female unemployment
rates are about 50 percent higher than those for males, a figure that is not unusual
relative to other labour markets in the world. The table also shows that the parti-
cipation gender gap narrowed between 1995 and 2005.
We turn next to labour market performance by educational attainment. We
classify the population into four education groups: Less than matric, matric, some




 There are few surprises.
Table 3 shows that higher education is correlated with better employment out-
comes and greater labour market participation. The largest increase in participation
from 1995 to 2005 is for workers with a matric or less. This group has also seen its
employment rate actually decline from 54 percent to 49.7 percent during this
period. Consequently, their unemployment rate almost doubled, from 15.2 percent
to 28.2 percent. Only those with a university degree have reasonably low unem-
ployment rates.
Table 4 categorizes the unemployed in 2005 by the duration of their unemploy-
ment spell and whether they have worked before. Most strikingly, almost 60 per-
cent of the unemployed have never held a job before. Long-term unemployment is
clearly a problem: of those who have worked before, 58.6 percent have been unem-
ployed for a year or more, whereas this figure is 68.3 percent for those who have
never worked. It is important to note that young people make up the majority of












The matriculation exam, or matric, is the South African high-school leaving exam. Holding a matric is
approximately equal to having a high-school education.
Table 2. Participation, employment and unemployment by gender (%)
Year Male Female
Participation Employment Unemployment Participation Employment Unemployment
1995 62.1 54.5 12.3 41.1 32.7 20.5
1997 57.9 47.7 17.7 39.2 28.2 28.1
1999 63.3 50.2 20.7 48.1 33.8 29.7
2001 66.5 48.7 26.7 53.0 34.8 34.4
2003 64.2 47.7 25.6 50.3 34.2 31.9






























Table 3. Participation, employment and unemployment by educational level (%)
 


























1995 44.8 36.6 18.4 63.7 54.0 15.2 80.6 76.8 4.6 85.8 84.0 2.1
1997 41.3 30.8 25.4 62.5 48.7 21.9 80.0 73.7 7.9 83.6 80.4 3.9
1999 47.8 34.6 27.7 68.8 50.4 26.7 85.0 74.3 12.6 87.4 82.2 6.0
2001 51.8 34.4 33.6 73.3 49.7 32.3 85.9 72.4 15.7 90.1 83.2 7.7
2003 48.4 33.1 31.6 71.2 49.2 30.9 89.1 76.1 14.6 89.7 85.6 4.6
2005 49.2 34.2 30.4 69.2 49.7 28.2 86.2 76.1 11.7 88.5 85.6 3.3
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2.1 Trends in labour supply
 
Figure 1 documents the increase in labour force participation rates in the late 1990s,
notably among females whose participation rate increased by 10 percentage points.
Participation rates have decreased since 2000, however some of this may be due to




 The main message of this figure is
that the entire secular movement in unemployment prior to 2005 can be accounted




 The respective shares of Africans, young people,
and females increased considerably. Indeed, we estimate that changes in composi-
tion of the labour force account for 31 percent of the increase in unemployment




In Figure 2 we present the actual unemployment series along with a counter-
factual series that is constructed by holding the labour force participation rate
constant at 1995 levels. The counterfactual rate is approximately the same at the
beginning and end of the period (1995–2005) with a rise and fall mirroring changes
in participation.
 
2.2 Patterns in labour demand
 





 The data show a dismal employment performance over the period
from 1970 to 2005 (see Table 5). Total employment only increased by 57 percent,
which implies an annualized growth rate of 1.3 percent per year. The number of
employees only increased 48.6 percent over the same period, which implies an




The sharp increase in participation between 1999 and 2000 may be partly attributed to changes in survey
















We rely on the analysis in Bhorat (2004) for trends in employment between 1970 and 1995 (using the
Census of 1970 and the 1995 OHS) and extend the analysis using the Labour Force Surveys of September
2000 and March 2005.
Table 4. Unemployment by previous working status and incomplete duration spell (%)
Worked before Never worked
41.1 58.9
< 1 year ≥ 1 year < 1 year ≥ 1 year
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 Contrasting this employment growth with the
fact that the population aged 14–65 grew at 2.68 percent per year paints a clear
picture of the role stagnant labour demand played in the unemployment problem.




Casale, Muller and Posel (2004) conclude that while a ‘substantial’ part of the employment growth from
1995 onwards is ‘real’, changes in data capture methods and definitions of employment between surveys
do contribute to the increase.
Figure 1. Participation and employment rates.
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 Alleyne and Subramanian (2001)
conclude that labour is being under utilized due to its high cost relative to capital.
 
3. Employment trends by sector and skill level: 1970–2005
 
The poor growth in total employment between 1970–2005 is associated with substantial
structural change. The primary sector – mainly Agriculture and Mining – was shedding
labour throughout the period while Finance, Wholesale and Retail Sales and Com-













In this section we adopt the same educational classification as Bhorat (2000). Individuals who earned a
diploma or a certificate are considered as having tertiary education.
Figure 2. Actual and counterfactual unemployment rates.
Table 5. Total employment
Source and Year Census 1970 OHS 1995 LFS Sep 2000 LFS Mar 2005
Total employment 7,709,476 10,151,548 11,969,273 12,107,554
Employee 6,294,614 8,659,211 9,084,569 9,353,677
Self employee 572,264 795,649 1,878,453 1,899,868
Domestic workers 842,598 696,688 1,006,251 854,009
Unemployment 303,165 1,998,914 4,088,846 4,288,875
Sources: Census 1970, OHS 1995 and LFS September 2000 and March 2005.
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Agriculture went from 33 percent of total employment to only 11 percent while
Wholesale and Retail Sales increased from 9 to 25 percent, and employment in the
financial sector also increased from 3 to 11 percent. This altered the composition of
employment in terms of educational attainment, favoring more skilled workers
(see Table 7). It also appears plausible that displaced workers from agriculture and
mining were unable to relocate to other regions where jobs might be available,
which could be why there are so many discouraged workers in rural areas.
 
14
3.1 The evolution of wages
 
It is safe to say that average real wages in South Africa have been stable or have








. (2007) for further analysis of the urban/rural dichotomy.
Table 6. Evolution of relative employment by industry (%)
Table 7. Evolution of relative employment by education level (%)
Industry Total employment Employees
1970 1995 2000 2005 1970 1995 2000 2005
Agriculture 33 14 17 11 33 14 10 8
Mining 9 5 5 4 9 6 7 5
Manufacturing 14 16 15 15 14 17 17 17
Utilities 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Construction 6 5 6 7 6 5 6 8
Wholesale and retail 9 19 23 25 9 17 18 19
Transport 4 6 5 5 4 6 6 6
Finance 3 7 9 11 3 7 11 11
Community 21 26 19 21 21 28 24 24
Education level Total employment Employees
1970 1995 2000 2005 1970 1995 2000 2005
None 38 7 7 5 38 7 5 4
Some primary 31 20 24 18 31 21 20 17
Some secondary 23 31 30 29 23 31 30 29
Complete secondary 6 24 21 29 6 24 24 31
Tertiary 1 17 18 18 1 17 21 19
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by approximately 10 percent during this time, because of a decline from 1995 to 1998




 This estimate contrasts with
that of Burger and Yu (2006) who estimate an increase of 4 percent over the same




 We consider only full-time employees to exclude most informal salaried workers that were captured
differentially in the early surveys. We also drop extremely high wage observations that are probably the
result of coding errors.
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 Using these data, Kingdon and Knight (2006a) find that the hourly wage
elasticity to local (broad) unemployment rates is approximately –0.018 when unemploy-
ment is between 10 and 30 percent, which, surprisingly, is similar to elasticities in
OECD countries with less rigid employment law. However, above 30 percent
unemployment, the elasticity goes to zero. It is important to note that the trends in
average real wages hide the evolution of a composition effect: while the real wages
of most groups declined, the share of high-income workers increased during this




 This is consistent with Leibbrandt,
Levinsohn and McCrary (2005), who find that the decline in real individual income




Labour unions have an important role in determining the evolution of wages





 In Table 8 we present the share of employees that were union

















  The rate of unionization grew from 5.5 percent in 1980 to 19 percent in 1985 (following the official
legalization of unions) to 37 percent in 1993 (Moll, 1993; Schultz and Mwabu, 1997).
Table 8. Share of employees that are union members
Industrial sector 1993 Oct. 1995 Oct. 1998 Sep. 2000 Feb. 2004
Agriculture 4.5 6.9 9.5 8.7 6.7
Mining 73.1 70.7 72.9 70.0 78.5
Manufacturing 48.0 45.7 45.6 41.5 40.2
Electricity and water 36.8 41.6 41.7 36.0 32.3
Construction 23.5 18.5 15.0 12.1 10.9
Wholesale, retail, hotel and restaurants 26.4 23.7 22.7 18.3 19.1
Transport, communication and finance 29.8 30.8 30.0 23.8 23.6
Educational, medical and legal 30.4 45.2 60.2 63.2 62.0
Domestic and other services 12.0 12.8 7.8 5.6 7.1
All industries 29.8 33.2 32.8 29.6 29.6
Source: For 1993, Schultz and Mwabu (1997) based on 1993 LSMS dataset. For 1995, 1998 and 2004, own
elaboration based on the OHS and LFS.
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in mining, manufacturing, electricity and water and educational, medical and legal
services. In most sectors, unionization rates are higher for Africans than for whites
(see Schultz and Mwabu, 1997).
The relationship between the union wage premium and labour productivity has
ramifications for unemployment. One could imagine that the presence of so many
unionized workers might drive up wages faster than productivity growth, thereby
exacerbating unemployment.19 Here we look mainly at the wages of unionized
workers over time in South Africa. Because collective bargained wages might be
extended to the non-union workers, our estimates might only capture part of the
effect of unions on competitive wages.20
We estimated a set of regressions to analyze the evolution of the union wage
premium for male salaried employees from 1995 to 2004. In the first column of
Table 9 we report a baseline model where we condition on a full set of education,
race, age, industry and occupation dummies.21 In column 2, following Butcher and
Rouse (2001), we include household fixed effects in the model. Thus, the union/
non-union gap is identified only through households with more than one full-time
male employee to introduce intra-household variability in union status. Column 3
presents the estimate of adding a public sector dummy to our baseline specification
in Column 1. In Column 4 we augment the specification of Column 3 with tenure
and tenure squared in the actual job as control variables. Finally, in Column 5 we
report an estimate of the union wage gap by the method of stratified matching using
the controls in Column 4 to estimate the propensity score. The latter column is our
preferred specification because it does the most to control for sample selection bias.
These estimates consistently show that the estimated union wage premium
increased during this period. The maximum premium seems to have occurred in
2000 – when employment dampened and wages were at their lowest levels. In
2004, we estimate the union wage gap for African males to be around 23 percent
(see column 5) and 17 percent for all males.22
4. Evidence on the speed of transitions
We now turn our attention to the most recent data and examine some of the dynamics
of the South African labour market. One might expect that the relatively stable
19 This is especially a problem because collective agreements reached by bargaining councils in South Africa
can be extended to all workers and to all firms in an industry (Bendix, 2003).
20 For 1995, Butcher and Rouse (2001) provide an estimate of the effect of unions on wages of non-unionized
workers in sectors with industrial councils on the order of 10 percent while the union-wage premium they
estimate is about 20 percent.
21 We also included province dummies interacted with an urban/rural dummy. This set of controls is
included in every regression presented in this section.
22 In another analysis (not shown) using the specification of Column 4, we found that the wage premium increased
















Table 9. Estimated coefficients – union wage premium (full-time males only)
Year Baseline model Baseline model + 
household fixed 
effects
Baseline model + 
public sector 
dummy




Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t
Africans only
OHS 1995 0.21 14.92 0.11 2.15 − − 0.18 12.87 0.14 7.61
OHS 1998 0.29 12.38 0.35 3.89 − − 0.25 10.38 0.20 6.97
LFS 2000 0.42 23.11 0.37 4.86 0.39 20.92 0.33 17.63 0.27 11.38
LFS 2004 0.41 21.95 0.47 5.40 0.37 19.28 0.33 17.13 0.23 6.92
All males
OHS 1995 0.19 17.65 0.19 5.09 − − 0.16 14.56 0.13 8.46
OHS 1998 0.27 13.75 0.33 4.71 − − 0.23 11.42 0.18 6.81
LFS 2000 0.38 25.03 0.43 7.19 0.34 22.00 0.29 18.96 0.25 11.00
LFS 2004 0.35 22.88 0.52 8.11 0.31 19.96 0.27 17.41 0.17 5.73
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unemployment rate since 2000 reflects structural inefficiencies in the labour market
that hinder transition. However, when we look directly at transitions it becomes
clear that this stability hides large gross flows between employment categories. We
disaggregate the unemployment data presented in Section 2, and examine transi-
tion rates by age, race and education.
For this analysis, we use newly constructed panel data comprising of matched
waves of the South African Labour Force Survey (LFS).23 The LFS panel is the first
nationally-representative panel data on employment in South Africa. It follows
individuals over time and permits us to directly observe employment transition.
The surveys are conducted bi-annually, with the first wave in February or March,
and the second wave in September of each year. From September 2001 (wave 4) to
March 2004 (wave 9), the sample involved a rotating panel design, with 20 percent
of respondents being rotated out between waves. The cross-sectional sample size
is approximately 30,000 households with about 100,000 individual observations;
the panel sample size ranges between 45,000 and 71,000.24
4.1 Transition matrices
The LFS panel data allow us to look at the experience of individuals over time to
determine who is making employment transitions and how large the gross flows
actually are. Table 10 presents the transition matrix for working-age adults for the
six-month period between September 2002 (wave 6) and March 2003 (wave 7).
23 See Appendix A in Banerjee et al. (2007) for a more detailed description of the data.
24 Each wave comes with a set of sampling weights, which we used in generating all of our results. The
weights correct for potential over-sampling of certain sub-populations, as well as for differential rates of
non-response.
Table 10. Employment status transition rates for adults (ages 16–64)
Wave 6 status N Retired NEA Wave 7 status Informal Formal Total
Discouraged Searching
Retired 1,065 68.5 16.3 3.1 2.0 7.3 2.9 100
NEA 7,057 2.9 68.0 9.3 12.1 4.3 3.5 100
Discouraged 2,264 1.9 19.1 36.1 28.8 9.9 4.2 100
Searching 3,630 0.8 14.2 16.4 49.8 9.3 9.5 100
Informal 2,496 3.2 12.0 8.1 13.0 51.9 11.9 100
Formal 6,677 0.9 3.4 1.6 5.0 4.8 84.3 100
Total 23,189 4.7 26.9 10.8 17.9 11.3 28.4 100
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These transition matrices for wave 6 to wave 7 are broadly representative of the
other wave-to-wave transitions in the panel.25 The transition probabilities in the
matrix show, for example, that
− Of adults 16–64 who are unemployed (and either discouraged or search-
ing), 9.6 percent find employment in the formal or informal sector after six
months.
− Discouraged workers most frequently transition into actively searching for
work. About 14 percent transition from discouraged and reportedly not
searching for work, to employed six months later.
− Discouraged workers are twice as likely to transition into the informal as
the formal sector, while the unemployed who are searching are equally
likely to transition into the informal or formal sectors. Almost 12 percent of
those who are initially working in the informal sector transition within six
months to the formal sector.
− Of those with formal sector employment, only 16 percent have transitioned
into another state after six months with the other 84 percent staying in the
formal sector.
− So-called retirement is apparently not a permanent (absorbing) state. Of
those who are retired in wave 6, only about 68 percent are classified as
retired six months later. This is perhaps an artefact of how data were
recorded, since another 16 percent were classified as not economically
active (NEA) six months later. Even if all the NEA were in fact still retired,
there are 15 percent of the so-called ‘retired’ who are either looking for
work or working six months on.
Most importantly, we are struck by just how much churning there appears to
be in the labour market. Although the aggregate unemployment figures in Table 1
show little change from LFS wave to wave, the individual-level data show remark-
able mobility. Examples include:
− Only about half of the workers who are employed in the informal sector are
still employed there six months later.
− Half of the workers who are listed as formally searching for a job are still
searching six months later.
− Only about a third of the workers who list themselves as discouraged are so
listed six months later.
− Even among the NEA, about 30 percent no longer report being in that
category after six months.
Rather than a sclerotic labour market where individuals tend to stay in the same
employment category from wave to wave, the transition data suggest a high level
of mobility at the individual level. One concern that we had is that this reflects the
25 Transitions matrices for a one-year period were generally similar as well. For brevity we do not present
these results here.
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burden of HIV/AIDS. Perhaps people are forced to transition out of the labour
market when they get very sick and return when they are in remission. This does
not appear to be the case. We can use the LFS data to identify those who changed
the labour market status because of their own illness. The results remain qualita-
tively similar when we leave them out: only the percentage of workers listed as
retired or NEA change slightly.26
There is no clear pattern of transition from the informal sector to the formal
sector, as is observed in many other developing countries.27 An equal proportion
transition from the informal sector into unemployed and searching as transition
into the formal sector.28
Table 11 gives transition probabilities for South African youth (ages 16–24
inclusive). We identify two reasons for high unemployment rates among young
people: low outflows because searching is not very successful, and high inflows
because, for example, high school dropouts go directly into unemployment and are
likely to remain there. Those between the ages of 16–24 who are searching for a job
are much more likely to transition into discouraged worker status than they are to
obtain employment (in the formal or informal sector). Of the youth classified as
NEA in wave 6 (most of whom are students), about 22 percent transition out of
NEA within six months – 18.5 percent into unemployment and only 3 percent into
employment. One policy response to this situation is for the government to induce
26 One caveat is that the data do not allow us to identify individuals who transition because they are caring
for family members ill with AIDS.
27 Respondents were determined to be in the informal or formal sector based on a series of questions about
whether the employer was registered, paying UIF for the employee or paying VAT. The vast majority of
unionized jobs are found in the formal sector, not in the informal sector.
28 However, men transition into the formal sector at a higher rate (16.5 percent) than women do (8.5
percent). See Banerjee et al. (2007).
Table 11. Employment status transition rates for youth (ages 16–24)
Wave 6 status N NEA Wave 7 status Formal Total
Discouraged Searching Informal
NEA 4,318 78.2 7.5 11.1 1.7 1.4 100
Discouraged 722 21.8 37.3 31.9 6.0 3.0 100
Searching 1,062 18.5 16.9 52.3 4.7 7.5 100
Informal 213 31.5 14.6 17.7 27.8 8.4 100
Formal 512 5.2 6.3 13.8 3.6 71.1 100
Total 6,827 53.9 12.8 21.1 3.8 8.4 100
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firms to create special low wage jobs for younger workers. Despite potential oppo-
sition from the unions, which are allied with the ruling party, such an institutional
arrangement does exist in South Africa (it is called a learnership) and it is in fact
subsidized. However, it is unclear how widespread the take-up of this program has
been. A careful analysis of this existing program, in light of the persistent unem-
ployment concentrated among the younger workers, seems appropriate.
The retention rate in the informal sector is low among youth (28 percent) sug-
gesting that this is likely to be casual (temporary) employment rather than a more
permanent attachment to the informal sector. Only about 8.5 percent of youth in
the informal sector transition into the formal sector between waves 6 and 7. They
are less likely to transition into the formal sector than they are to transition into
any other employment category. These analyses of youth transition probabilities all
point to the potential benefits of getting young workers into their first job. The
school-to-work transition is key and it simply is not working at present.
Table 12 presents labour market transitions for Africans and whites. We discuss
outcomes for Coloureds and Indians but do not show those matrices here.29
29 See Banerjee et al. (2007).
Table 12. Employment status transition rates for adults by race (ages 16–64)
Wave 6 status N Retired NEA Wave 7 status Informal Formal Total
Discouraged Searching
African
Retired 753 66.8 15.8 3.7 2.2 9.9 1.7 100
NEA 5,425 2.4 67.8 10.7 12.6 4.7 1.8 100
Discouraged 2,028 1.7 18.7 37.3 28.6 10.1 3.6 100
Searching 3,121 0.7 13.6 17.3 51.1 9.1 8.2 100
Informal 2,196 3.3 11.7 8.8 13.5 53.0 9.7 100
Formal 3,743 0.5 2.9 2.2 6.7 5.8 81.9 100
Total 17,266 4.2 28.1 13.2 20.7 13.0 20.9 100
White
Retired 142 76.6 13.2 1.0 0.4 0.6 8.2 100
NEA 500 5.1 71.6 2.6 5.4 2.4 12.9 100
Discouraged 33 19.5 30.9 23.4 5.5 0.0 20.7 100
Searching 61 5.3 18.7 8.1 31.1 11.8 24.9 100
Informal 61 2.1 13.4 0.0 6.3 18.8 59.4 100
Formal 1,327 1.9 4.4 0.7 1.4 2.6 89.0 100
Total 2,124 8.3 20.6 1.7 3.4 3.2 62.9 100
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Outcomes for African workers are generally worse than for the other population
groups: they are more likely to remain in the informal sector, less likely to transi-
tion from the informal sector into the formal sector, and less likely to retain formal
sector employment should they obtain it. The informal sector can be characterized
as a second-best alternative to formal employment – the returns to education are
generally lower than in the formal sector. While only 19 percent of whites in the
informal sector remain there after six months, over 50 percent of Africans and
Coloureds, and 43 percent of Indians do. About 60 percent of whites in the infor-
mal sector transition to the formal sector after six months; the corresponding figure
for Coloureds and Indians is about 20 percent, and for Africans is below 10 percent.
African workers are proportionally less likely to retain a formal sector job than are
other races. In a six-month period, whites are about 7 percentage points more likely
than Africans to remain in the formal sector, while Coloureds and Indians are
about 4 percentage points more likely than Africans to do so. If we condition on
gender, age, education level, urban/rural and whether the individual has held a
job before, the gap between whites and Africans is only reduced slightly to 5.5
percent (results not shown).
Job search is more effective for whites and Indians than it is for Africans and
Coloureds. Of those who are actively job searching, 50 percent of Africans and 45
percent of Coloureds are still searching after six months, whereas only 30 percent
of whites and Indians remain in this state. Africans are more likely to move from
actively searching to either discouraged or NEA than into employment, while the
other population groups are more likely to move into employment in the formal
sector or NEA than into the other categories. It is troubling that as many as 17
percent of Africans who are actively searching for a job transition into discourage-
ment within six months. This raises questions about the efficacy of various search
methods and the reasons why so many Africans transition into discouragement.
The proportion of discouraged workers in the labour force has been growing,
with African workers comprising a larger portion of discouraged workers over
time.30 Discouraged worker status is a much more sticky employment status for
Africans than for the other population groups: 50 percent remain discouraged six
months later, while this figure is approximately 23 percent for Coloureds and
whites, and only 12 percent for Indians. A troubling statistic is the magnitude of
the outflow of Africans from the formal sector directly into the discouraged worker
category – HIV/AIDS may be part of the explanation for this. Levinsohn et al.
(2008) present evidence in support of this.
4.2 Summary
The results from this section suggest that the bulk of the unemployment is struc-
tural rather than transitional. This does not mean that there are no transitional
30 LFS 2000–2005, Broad definition of unemployment.
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elements in what we observe. Nor should we conclude that the elements identified
in this section, such as search costs, are unimportant. But if they play a role, it is
not so much because the economy is in transition, but because they interact with
other structural features of the economy.
The great deal of churning in the labour market presents two avenues for policy:
increase the inflow into the formal sector and/or slow the outflow out of it. The
labour market appears to be very near the steady state so it is unlikely that the
unemployment rate will fall without intervention or an external shock. This evidence
does not tell us whether these transitions out of the formal sector are voluntary
quits or lay-offs (although anecdotal evidence suggests they are the former), but
high turnover in the workforce generally leads to a sub-optimal level of investment
in firm- or industry-specific human capital on the part of workers and the employers.
On the other hand, workers seem to have a reasonable chance of finding jobs, but
the large bi-directional flows may be hiding changes in the skill composition of the
formal sector discussed in section 3. If firms have been upgrading the skill level of
their labour force as real wages remain stable, then we may have a more sclerotic
labour market than it seems, as one set of people lost their jobs and a very different
set gained.
4.3 Search
Search costs are an underlying reason why unemployment and the informal sector
are more ‘sticky’ labour market outcomes for some groups than for others.31 As
shown above, Africans and Coloureds are more likely to remain searching than
whites or Indians. The differential effectiveness of search may be accounted for by
the legacy of apartheid-era spatial separation between Black job seekers and the
centres of business and industry where the jobs are. Workers from surrounding
areas need to search for jobs far from their homes, and this is generally a major
discouragement. To make matters worse, the lack of high-density urban centres
make the costs of job search particularly high in South Africa, thereby reducing the
effectiveness of the job search of a large part of the population and increasing the
equilibrium unemployment rate.
The history of racial prejudice may be another reason why search is a particular
problem in South Africa. Kingdon and Knight (2004a) find that about one-third of
the African/Coloured/Indian–white unemployment gap remains unexplained after
controlling for observable characteristics. Discrimination is one factor that probably
plays a role in the remaining gap. As known from the work of Diamond (1984),
search models admit multiple equilibria with differing levels of search, and a small
amount of prejudice could tip the equilibrium towards the inefficient low search
equilibrium (or shift the unique equilibrium towards the low search outcome).
31 See Banerjee et al. (2007) for a more detailed discussion of these issues.
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High search costs could in principle explain high levels of transitional unemploy-
ment when combined with the fact that the demand and supply of labour in South
Africa had shifted enormously during this period, making large reallocations
necessary. High search costs would slow down this transition, though whether that
increases or decreases unemployment depends on whether, on balance, this leads
to more time spent searching.
4.4 The informal sector
Another way in which many sub-Saharan African countries often deal with rigid-
ities in the formal sector labour market is through a burgeoning informal sector.
South Africa, though, has a relatively small informal sector relative to its African
neighbours. One reason this might be the case is that a spirit of entrepreneurship
was actively discouraged for decades under apartheid. This history may help
explain why the informal sector has not grown as quickly as one might otherwise
expect.32 The transitions evidence in Table 10 shows that the informal sector does
not act as a ‘springboard’ into the formal sector for very many people.
4.5 Reservation wages
Unemployment is especially high among workers under the age of 35, and most of
these unemployed young people have never worked before. One possible inter-
pretation of this phenomenon is that people claim that they want a job and are
looking, but really are not, either because they are looking for a job that is not there
(a job that would pay them a lot or one that is in their backyard) or because they
are putting very little effort into their job searches. In other words, they are not
looking for the job that they can get.
Why might this be a particular problem in South Africa? One answer is that
South Africa’s social pension program is particularly generous, paying each senior
South African something of the order twice the per capita income.33 No other middle-
income country has a comparable program. This is a result of extending the very
generous apartheid-era pension program for whites to the rest of the population.
4.5.1 Pensions and reservation wages
One consequence of this program is that many unemployed South Africans can
survive without having to take a job, as long as their elders are willing to support
them. This would mean that they might put less effort into job search and be
fussier about jobs they take. There is some evidence that this is indeed a problem.
Bertrand, Mullainathan and Miller (2003), using data from the mid-1990s, show
32 See Kingdon and Knight (2007) for a further discussion of why the informal sector may be underdeveloped.
33 Despite being means-tested, the pension has near-universal coverage of elderly South Africans.
736 Banerjee ET AL. 
© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2008 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
evidence that people who have family members who are eligible for the pension
tend to work less than they would otherwise. More recent (and perhaps more
convincing) evidence is provided by Ranchhod (2007). His article analyzes the
change in employment and labour force participation rates using the panel com-
ponents in the LFS. He investigates whether the loss of a pensioner generates a
corresponding increase in labour force participation. He finds an increase in
employment rates amongst adults, particularly adult women, of between 5 and 6
percentage points. In the high unemployment context already described, this is a
large and economically important increase. This might also explain the particular
age structure of unemployment – perhaps people start looking seriously for a job
when their parents die (or are dying), which is why people above thirty are more
likely to be employed. People above thirty are also much more likely to be married
and/or have children, which might also make it harder for them to depend on their
parents.34 Indeed, Klasen and Woolard (2008) find that household formation is
sensitive to old age pension income, potentially drawing the unemployed away
from employment opportunities.
4.5.2 Education, expectations and reservation wages
Another reason why South Africa is different from many other countries is that
there has been an enormous transformation of the structure of the labour force over
the last 15 years. The implementation of the compulsory schooling laws has meant
that almost all of the younger workers now have 10 years or so of education, whereas
many of those who grew up under apartheid only had a few years of education.
This means that the return to schooling and the benefits of having matriculated
have probably fallen substantially. If the newly educated workers have not yet
understood this, they may be holding out for jobs that are no longer going to be
available to them. This may be why younger workers and especially matriculates
among them have done so badly in recent years in terms of employment.
4.5.3 Employment attitudes and reservation wages
Despite the general plausibility of a high reservation wage being a constraint a
number of scholars have argued against this possibility.35 In the LFS waves, all
persons who were not working in the past seven days were asked why they were
not working. Reservation wages do not seem to be an important part of the
story. From age 20 to 50, the most common reason provided is that people cannot
find any work. Indeed, from age 20 to 40, over half of the respondents chose this
34 See also Banerjee et al. (2007) for an extended discussion.
35 For example, Nattrass and Walker (2005) find that reservation wages in a working-class suburb of Cape
Town match predicted wages fairly closely. Also, Kingdon and Knight find that the unemployed are less
happy (2004b) and that job search and happiness are not both determined by some unobserved factor
(2006b). If unemployment were voluntary, we would expect the unemployed to be as happy as the
employed, and discouraged workers to be as happy as the searching unemployed.
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category.36 Taken by itself it argues against the reservation wages view, but it is not
clear that we can infer from these answers that they have seriously looked for and
not found a job.
4.6 Summary
Our analysis of transitions demonstrates that there is a lot of churning going on in
the labour market. We suspect there is selective churning: the characteristics of
workers in the inflow to and outflow from the formal sector, for example, are
probably not identical. However, we are unable to capture the nature of the sorting
with the demographic variables we included in our analysis. Transition from the
informal sector to the formal sector is more likely for more advantaged groups
(whites, men, those with more education). This evidence suggests that in addition
to the skill-composition changes documented in Section 2, employers may be more
selective along other dimensions of quality (experience, for example) that put the
currently unemployed at even more of a disadvantage.
Despite the high rate of transition, many young workers do not transition into
the labour force and instead remain unemployed (discouraged or searching) for
long periods. The inability of these workers to enter the labour force and obtain
their first job suggests an important role of high search costs, compounded by high
turnover in the labour market (which reduces the incentive to invest in search), and
of high reservation wages due to family support.
5. Conclusion
We noted at the outset that changes in the unemployment rate could be viewed as
resulting from either a temporary shock or a more permanent structural change.
We proceeded by using several nationally representative household surveys to
investigate multiple aspects of South African unemployment. On the more aggre-
gate level, we noted that the demand for unskilled labour had fallen and that this
was particularly manifested in the agricultural and mining sectors. Concurrent
with the decline in the demand for less-skilled labour, there was a large increase
in the supply of less skilled labour. Much of this increase was in the form of a large
influx of African women into the labour market. The result of the increased supply
and decreased demand was, predictably, increased unemployment.
We view the massive influx of female labour supply as a structural change, not
a temporary shock. There is simply no evidence to suggest that women are likely
to exit the labour market in the sort of numbers that entered any time soon. Similarly,
36 Note that this is not that they cannot find suitable work, in terms of ‘salary, location or work conditions’,
as this was captured by a separate answer choice.
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there is little reason to expect that agriculture or mining are likely to become more
labour intensive. The fact that mining employment has fallen rather steadily during
the recent commodity boom leads us to believe that the decline in mining employ-
ment is also a structural shift rather than a transitory shock. Finally, the decline in
agricultural employment also strikes us as a structural shift. The South African
economy has moved into sectors such as financial services and other service sec-
tors, and agriculture is on the downswing.
In Section 3, we noted that there have been important compositional changes in
employment at the sectoral level. In particular, the pool of the employed has
tended to become more skilled while the less skilled have more often become
relegated to the ranks of the unemployed. This is a global phenomenon and is in
no way unique to South Africa. Many economists attribute these sectoral changes
to skill-biased technical change, which has impacted South Africa at an especially
inopportune time, for it tends to amplify the unemployment consequences of the
increase in labour supply of unskilled workers.
Section 4 turned more closely to the individual-level evidence and explored how
workers have adjusted (or not) to the changing labour market that is highlighted
in Sections 2 and 3. There we found that examining the employed/unemployed
dichotomy is too simple. Among the employed, it matters if one is in the formal or
informal sector and among the unemployed, the actively searching versus discour-
aged worker distinction matters a great deal to outcomes. We examined the likeli-
hood of transitions from one labour market status to another, and the results are
especially informative for policy. For example, the data indicate that there is sub-
stantial entry into and exit from the informal sector, but transitions are typically to
some form of unemployment or lack of labour market participation. Transitions
from the informal sector to the formal sector are surprisingly rare. The transitions
results are especially stark when it comes to youth. Obtaining that first job is
crucial to future involvement in the labour market. It appears to be exceedingly
difficult for many, and simply having a matric degree is of little help.
Because most of the reasons for unemployment are structural, policy is especially
needed. Simply waiting for the positive ‘shock’ to counter the negative one is unlikely
to be fruitful. Neither do we believe that macroeconomic policy is likely to solve
the unemployment problem. Were unemployment the result of a temporary easing
of demand, this might make sense, but, as noted above, our analysis points to
structural causes of the rise in unemployment.
We have restricted ourselves in this article to analysis that is supported by the
data. An implication of this research strategy is that we have not engaged in much
‘big think’ speculation on what might solve the unemployment dilemma. Some
constraints are especially prominent and deserve policy consideration. One of these
is the hurdle of school-leavers obtaining their first job. There are several policy
options including a wage subsidy, a search subsidy, reduced regulations for first
jobs, and government employment. Another constraint is the mismatch between
where the unemployed live and where formal sector jobs are located. Here policy
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options include transportation subsidies, housing policy, business location policy,
and infrastructure investment, among others. Yet another constraint is the mismatch
between the skill set of the unemployed and the skills required in the labour market.
Training programs and training subsidies are short-term remedies, however they
might only succeed in reordering the queue of job seekers. In the longer run, educa-
tional reform will be required to ease the mismatch and increase human capital. At
this point, our analysis is simply insufficient to distinguish between the many
options that might plausibly ease each constraint. Rather, we advocate a cautious
approach that includes a focus on experimentation. We believe that much can be
learned from smaller-scale interventions that are well designed and which are
accompanied by careful evaluation. That is the prudent next step.
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